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1.Introduction
The challenge of sustainability should feature prominently on any ‘risk register’ of devel-
opment prospects of any country (and indeed for the world as a whole). In this report, we 
explore a number of aspects of this challenge for Kuwait. Of course, this begs an initial, 
more basic, question: what is meant by sustainability? Specifically, here, it is development 
that should be sustained although there is no unified theory of what sustainable develop-
ment is. For example, it could be understood as it is in the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals or SDGs as comprising three pillars – society, the economy and the 
environment – as well as more detailed themes (and sub-themes) reflecting development 
outcomes and processes.1 It could also be understood as a nexus of critical resources such 
as water, energy and food.2 This emphasises resource security alongside resource scarcity 
as well as resource interdependencies as limiting factors for development.
Our starting point to thinking about sustainability, in this report, is not unrelated to these 
approaches. It does, however, have a further distinct perspective: sustaining wealth as one 
means of boosting prospects that development will be sustained. From a national per-
spective, this is concerned with how a country is managing its national wealth. From a 
global perspective, this is how planetary wealth is managed. A critical component – in 
both cases – is natural wealth, or natural capital: stocks of resources and ecosystems (and 
natural processes) that provide flows of nature services that sustain human well-being 
and development in a multitude of ways.3 
Our emphasis on wealth and sustainability is highly relevant to Kuwait in at least three 
ways. First, Kuwait’s development – past and present – is heavily reliant on non-renewable 
natural capital (i.e. petroleum resources): a special, yet challenging, case for sustainability 
with respect to national wealth management. Secondly, its resource depletion and use 
contribute to a global climate liability. Thirdly, a changing climate has implications for 
national wealth in Kuwait in other ways, too: notably, the costs of climate change to the 
domestic economy including its produced capital and human capital.
1   See, for example, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals Report’, United Nations (New York, 2020). The 
interpretation of sustainable development as three pillars can also be traced to the WCED, Brundtland 
Report: Our Common Future (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987). 
2   Christian Siderius, Declan Conway, Mohamed Yassine, Lisa Murken and Pierre-Louis Lostis, ‘Charac-
terising the Water-Energy-Food Nexus in Kuwait and the Gulf Region’, LSE Middle East Centre Kuwait 
Programme Paper Series 1 (London, 2019).
3   See, for example: Kirk Hamilton and Cameron Hepburn (eds), National Wealth: What is Missing, Why 
it Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); ‘The State of Natural Capital’, UK Natural Capital 
Committee (London, 2015).
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Our contribution in this project can also be seen in these three ways, specifically:4
• We assess development prospects in Kuwait by reviewing existing metrics of national 
wealth and natural capital. Our contribution is deliberately circumspect and is mostly 
used as a means to explain the wealth-based approach to sustainability. Neverthe-
less, what emerges is also a general point about established statistical frameworks for 
natural capital accounting as yet to be introduced in Kuwait as well as a more specific 
point about how this throws light, for example, on whether sufficient wealth is being 
sustained via payments into Kuwait’s Future Generations Fund. 
• We construct a comprehensive greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions inventory for Kuwait 
using one of the hierarchy of options for applying the Intergovernmental Panel for 
Climate Change (IPCC) methodology. The resulting inventory is a crucial ingredient 
in assessing Kuwait’s contribution, via its domestic emissions, to the global climate lia-
bility. It is also a basic input for: e.g. (a) assessing a nation’s domestic emissions and 
(b) modelling climate policies which seek to reduce GHG emissions from this baseline.
• We provide an exploratory risk assessment of the impact of climate change on the 
Kuwaiti economy by applying a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with 
different climate change scenarios. The focus here is on food security only and so 
our assessment is inevitably partial. However, it provides an initial assessment of the 
impacts of global climate change on an essential element of the domestic economy.
The remainder of this report is organised along the above lines: Section 2 discusses 
wealth and sustainability; Section 3 summarises our GHG emissions inventory; Section 4 
is an overview of climate scenarios and illustrating their implications for food security in 
Kuwait; lastly, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Wealth and Sustainability
For countries such as Kuwait – with substantial reserves of non-renewable natural 
capital – a critical question is how to manage resource revenues to ensure the sustain-
ability of wealth. At a very general level, guidance typically draws on the Hartwick rule 
- a rule of thumb for investing resource revenues in produced capital.5 Conceivably, this 
could be any alternative asset yielding a sustained return. As such, it includes invest-
ment in financial assets abroad in portfolios such as sovereign wealth funds. But the 
4   These work packages are detailed in three separate background papers prepared as part of this research 
project. These are as follows: (a) Wealth Accounting and Kuwait; (b) Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inven-
tory for the State of Kuwait: Baseline Year 2015; and (c) Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenarios and Food 
Security in Kuwait: Simulation Experiments Using a Recursive Dynamic CGE model. These are available 
on request from the authors.
5   John M. Hartwick, ‘Intergenerational Equity and the Investment of Rents from Exhaustible 
Resources’, American Economic Review 67/5 (1977), pp. 972–4. The relevance here is investment rules 
for managing exhaustible resources while assuming an overarching development objective of sus-
taining consumption. Specifically, what has become known as the Hartwick Rule showed that future 
consumption can be sustained when exhaustible resources are extracted if other investments offset 
the value of resource depletion.
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general point stands: this is the requirement for an investment strategy that sustains 
(overall) wealth as the means to safeguard development prospects.6
A number of contributions have elaborated further on the theoretical foundations for 
this guidance. These explore the circumstances in which well-being cannot be sustained 
if ‘net’ investment, which subtracts the value of resource depletion, is negative. This 
includes a generalisation of the Hartwick rule that allows for consumption and well-being 
to be growing over time (i.e. not just sustained) even in economies with non-renewable 
natural capital.7 Just as important has been measurement frameworks for constructing 
practical metrics based on such insights. Under the broad heading of wealth accounting, 
this has involved rethinking the statistical systems on which development is evaluated at 
the macroeconomic level.8
Practical foundations for this are now provided by the resource accounting principles 
laid out in the Central Framework of the United Nations System of Environmental and 
Economic Accounts (UN SEEA-CF).9 The Central Framework is a statistical standard, 
meaning that it has been adopted at the end of a lengthy UN statistical process as the 
official template for how countries (specifically, their official statistical agencies) should 
undertake this national accounting activity. At present, however, the Central Statistical 
Bureau (CSB) in Kuwait does not appear to publish accounts along the lines of the SEEA-
CF. For example, the single accounting item for resource extent in CSB10 is value-added in 
the oil and gas sector. This is a broader measure of resource dependence and abundance 
than the resource metrics in the SEEA-CF. 
A sense of the additional information provided, were the SEEA-CF to be implemented 
in Kuwait, is summarised in Table 1. The initial five rows correspond to summary aggre-
gates in the conventional UN System of National Accounts (SNA) based on existing data 
6   There is a debate about the relative importance of different assets. Practical discussion tends to focus 
on a balanced wealth portfolio as critical for sustainability: see, for example, Edward B. Barbier, Nature 
and Wealth: Overcoming Environmental Scarcity and Inequality (Palgrave MacMillan: London, 2015). This 
might also entail a focus on protecting elements of natural capital such as ecosystem assets. This rep-
resents a greater development challenge because current human actions would be significantly more 
constrained (as certain development paths would be effectively ‘off-limits’). A key argument for observ-
ing such constraints is that natural capital is non-substitutable (i.e. cannot be easily replaced, if at all). 
7   Kirk Hamilton and Michael Clemens, ‘Genuine Savings Rates in Developing Countries’, World Bank 
Economic Review 13/2 (1999), pp. 333–56; Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Goran Mäler, ‘Net National Product, 
Wealth and Social Welfare’, Environment and Development Economics 5/1 (2000), pp. 69–93; Kirk Ham-
ilton and Cees A.A.M. Withagen, ‘Savings, Growth and Path of Utility’, Canadian Journal of Economics 
40/2 (2007), pp. 703–13.
8   There is also a connection from this work to the ‘Beyond GDP’ debate. This concerns how novel 
metrics might: (a) reflect better the sustainability of development and (b) broaden the notion of 
well-being that is being evaluated along a development path. What this means exactly has led to volu-
minous proposals. The myriad metrics supporting the various objectives (and sub-objectives) of the 
SDGs is an exemplar in this respect.
9   ‘System of Environmental-Economic Accounts 2012 – Central Framework’, United Nations (New 
York, 2014).
10   Various years, CSB (Kuwaiti Central Statistical Bureau). Available at https://www.csb.gov.kw/Pag-
es/-Statistics_en?ID=55&ParentCatID=3 (accessed 23 June 2020).
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published by the CSB. This includes GDP and gross saving.11 Subtracting the consumption 
of fixed capital (i.e. the depreciation of produced capital) from these respective aggregates 
provides estimates of net domestic product (NDP) and net domestic saving. The remain-
ing rows of the table provide information added by the SEEA-CF.
Table 1: Resource Accounting in Kuwait, 2010–17 (current Kuwaiti dinar, millions) 12





33,079 42,512 48,722 49,392 46,285 34,473 33,056 36,261
Gross saving 15,234 16,636 18,862 20,514 21,632 22,663 23,448 24,875
Cons. of 
fixed capital
2,515 2,672 2,948 3,001 2,871 2,881 3,035 3,235
Net domestic 
product 
30,564 39,839 45,774 46,391 43,414 31,593 30,021 33,026
Net domestic 
saving




2,391,157 3,410,954 3,550,968 3,450,287 3,104,125 1,593,578 1,262,143 1,692,416 
Resource 
rent
19,980 32,805 38,384 36,530 32,204 16,513 13,527 17,033
Depletion 
value








27,056 33,410 37,590 38,720 36,731 28,166 27,122 29,592
Depl-adj, net 
saving
9,211 7,534 7,729 9,841 12,077 16,355 17,514 18,206
11   GDP minus final consumption expenditures.
12   Source: CSB (various years); ‘World Development Indicators’, World Bank (Washington DC, various 
years).
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Resource asset values are calculated as the present value of resource rents – the differ-
ence between the value of resource production and the economic cost of extraction – up 
to the point of exhaustion.13,14 The magnitude of these asset values – the resource wealth 
of the economy – provides important guidance regarding future prospects.15 Another 
important question is when resources are extracted, in a given year, what is the actual 
contribution to the current economy? 
An answer to this in the SEEA-CF starts with a decomposition of the estimate of current 
resource rents into two components: depletion value and natural resource income.16 The 
former is equivalent to the depreciation of the resource asset and natural resource income 
is the (net) return on that asset. Table 1 provides an illustration of this. Over the period 
2010–2017, it is evident that natural resource income is substantially higher than depletion 
values. The proximate reason for this disparity is reasonably straightforward: relatively 
high reserve lifetimes in Kuwait. 
A practical link between saving and sustainability is that the depreciation of non-re-
newable natural capital – i.e. the depletion value in Table 1 – should be reinvested when 
this finite asset is used up. Two depletion-adjusted economic aggregates defined in the 
SEEA-CF reflect this insight and construct metrics which are net of depreciation: 17 
• Depletion-adjusted net domestic product (aNDP): This is defined as GDP minus the 
value of depreciation of produced capital and resource depletion. Note then this 
means that natural resource income counts positively in aNDP, while depletion 
values are subtracted.
• Depletion-adjusted net saving: This is defined as GDP minus consumption (i.e. gross saving 
in the economy) minus the value of depreciation of produced capital – i.e. consumption 
of fixed capital in the SNA terminology18 – and the total value of resource depletion.
13   The economic cost of extraction includes all current extraction costs, depreciation and the opportu-
nity cost of produced capital (used in the extraction process). 
14   The resource lifetime used to calculate the point of exhaustion is defined in terms of the ratio of 
the extent of physical reserves (typically measured as the sum of proven and probable resources) to 
current production. Resource rents are typically fixed at the current year and held constant up to the 
point of exhaustion. A final ingredient in this present value calculation is a discount rate.
15   The fall in resource prices after 2014 results in a significant fall in these metrics.
16   The value of resource depletion is measured as the unit value of depletion times the quantity 
extracted. This unit value is equal to the current resource asset value divided by the current physical 
stock. Each depletion unit is therefore valued according to its average value. Specifically, it is estimated 
as the average price – in effect the average rent – of the resource in situ (i.e. in the ground).
17   The empirical link between saving and sustainability was first explored by David W. Pearce and Giles 
Atkinson, ‘Capital Theory and the Measurement of Sustainable Development: An Indicator of “Weak” 
Sustainability’, Ecological Economics 8/2 (1993), pp. 103–8. This took the form of a metric of ‘net’ savings: 
that is, net of changes in assets including the value of resource depletion. Kirk Hamilton, ‘Green Adjust-
ments to GDP’, Resources Policy 20/3 (1994), pp. 155–68, subsequently named this metric as ‘genuine 
saving’ and this terminology has largely stuck. However, World Bank (various years) label their analo-
gous metric as ‘Adjusted Net Saving’. This has been published in its ‘World Development Indicators’ for 
over 150 countries since the late 1990s. UN (2014) refer to depletion-adjusted net saving, as discussed 
elsewhere in this section. 
18   This, in turn, refers to e.g. physical wear and tear on fixed assets such as machinery and buildings
10 Sustainability, Natural Capital and Climate Change in Kuwait
Table 1 describes this data for Kuwait. Depletion-adjusted net saving is positive over the 
years described. It is important to note that this is a partial measure of net saving given 
it does not consider investment in human capital or depreciation in other categories of 
natural capital (such as climate change damage, although see below for further discus-
sion). Notwithstanding such caveats, on the face of it, it appears that for the economy as a 
whole net saving exceeds what would be required to satisfy the basic sustainability advice 
exemplified by the Hartwick rule. That said, depletion-adjusted net saving as a proportion 
of GDP is broadly declining over the period. 
These highly aggregated insights take us only so far. Relating this wealth accounting to the 
public finances is also important given that a critical pathway for boosting savings from 
resource depletion arises from appropriating these benefits through state revenues. In the 
case of Kuwait, a critical channel is its wealth funds, specifically the Future Generations 
Fund. A comparison of depletion values (such as in Table 1) and payments into the fund 
provides a preliminary assessment of actual investment vis-à-vis a benchmark established 
by wealth accounting.
Figure 1 illustrates this comparison. Published data on payments into the fund are partial 
and appear to go back to 2008/09 only.19 Fund payments are based on a proportion of state 
revenues: typically, this has been 10 percent although from 2013 to about 2016 this was 
raised to 25 percent.20 The Figure describes simulated and actual fund payments based on 
two possible fiscal rules – of 10 percent and 25 percent of total state revenues – over the 
period 1998/99 to 2016/17.21 In effect, depletion values are a benchmark since this is what 
sustaining wealth, in theory, requires to be invested.
19   The Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance (various years) publishes data for 2017/18 to 2019/20, outside of the 
period covering our estimates of depletion values. See https://www.mof.gov.kw/MofBudget/MofBudget-
Detail.aspx-#mofBudget2 (accessed 23 June 2020).
20   Rolando Ossowski and Hårvard Halland, Fiscal Management in Resource Rich Countries: Countries: 
Essentials for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers (Washington DC: World Bank 
Group, 2016).
21   World Bank data on depletion values and CSB data on government revenues are measured by calen-
dar year and fiscal year respectively. We have therefore adapted the former for more easy comparison 
in Figure 1. 
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What seems clear is that the 10 percent rule (i.e. paying 10 percent of state revenues in the 
Future Generations Fund) falls short of this benchmark while the 25 percent rule exceeds it 
although tracks depletion values relatively better. There are several caveats of course. The 
depletion value is a basic sustainability benchmark only: additional development objec-
tives provide reasons why countries might wish to save more (economic growth) or less 
(current distributional concerns). There are also different pathways whereby resource 
revenues generate benefits in the domestic economy; some of which will be consumption 
but some of which can also be construed as investment.23
Sustainability, so far in this section, has been defined in terms of how exhaustible resources 
– specifically petroleum resources – are depleted, as well as how proceeds of this eco-
nomic activity are reinvested. Of course, a further – and increasingly more prominent 
– sustainability challenge is the pollution emissions arising from use of these resources 
in economic activity. Most notably the use of fossil fuels in economic production and 
consumption augments the stock of carbon dioxide (CO2 and greenhouse gases, GHGs, 
more generally). This creates a liability, which in turn can be construed as diminishing a 
corresponding asset: namely, global climate stability. 
One important line of enquiry that follows this reasoning is focused on obsolescence in 
national wealth or ‘stranded assets’ and the extent to which carbon taxes and binding 
carbon budgets will render petroleum reserves ‘unburnable’ in the future.24 What this 
22   Authors’ calculations based on CSB (various years) and World Bank (various years).
23   See Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, ‘Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent 
Distribution in Kuwait’, LSE Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf 
States 13 (London, 2011).
24   See, for example: Glenn-Marie Lange, Quentin Wodon and Kevin Carey, ‘The Changing Wealth of 
Nations 2018: Building a Sustainable Future’, World Bank (Washington DC, 2018); Christophe McGlade 
and Paul Ekins ‘The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming 
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means is that the resource asset values in Figure 1 overestimate the global value of these 
same assets (because of the prospective climate liabilities). Moreover, given the context 
of a changing global climate, consideration of climate damage as part of the economic 
analysis of projects which exploit remaining petroleum reserves is clearly desirable.25 
A separate question arises for wealth accounting: given current production of petroleum 
reserves, how is the global liability arising from resource use and associated GHG emis-
sions to be accounted for in specific countries? There are a number of answers to this 
question.26 This includes:
• Depletion emissions: resource depleting countries account for emissions embodied in 
the fossil fuels that they produce in a given year. In effect, this accounts for emissions 
at original source.
• Production emissions: resource using countries’ account for emissions produced as a 
result of combustion of fossil fuels within their own borders.
• Consumption emissions: countries account for GHG emissions embodied in their final 
consumption of goods and services.
These different perspectives all involve different standpoints on responsibility for the global 
climate liability and, as a result, different accounting rules and procedures. As a practical 
matter, each arguably provides interesting and distinct insights on GHG emissions along 
winding supply chains.27 Moreover, this general setting is also a way of understanding where 
the contributions in the remainder of this report are situated. Our GHG emissions inventory 
(Section 3) is the basis for better understanding Kuwait’s responsibility for climate change 
damage arising from its own domestic emissions. Our climate risk assessment (Section 4) 
provides an initial analysis of climate change damage in Kuwait.
to 2°C’, Nature 517 (2015), pp. 187–90.
25   Giles Atkinson and Kirk Hamilton (2020) ‘Sustaining Wealth: Simulating a Sovereign Wealth Fund for 
the UK’s Oil and Gas Resources, Past and Future’, Energy Policy 139 (2020).
26   See, for a review, Matthew Agarwala, ‘Natural Capital Accounting Perspectives for Measuring Sus-
tainable Development’, unpublished PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science 
(London, 2020).  
27   According to data in World Bank (various years), in 2017 it accounted for about 3 percent of global oil 
production and 6 percent of oil (proven plus probable reserves). ‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2019’, British Petroleum (London, 2019) estimates that Kuwait exported just over two thirds of crude oil 
production in this same year.
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3. Constructing a Greenhouse Gas Inventory 
Our GHG emissions inventory was conducted within an overarching criterion of 
strict adherence to the relevant IPCC protocols.28 This is important for purposes of 
transparency and replicability. This does entail some exercise of choices as the IPCC 
methodology has a degree of inbuilt flexibility. Specifically, three ‘tiers’ represent a hier-
archy of levels of complexity in data and parameters at which national inventories can 
be estimated.29 Higher levels of complexity are clearly desirable in principle but so too 
are practical matters. For Kuwait, given the available data and project resources, it was 
only feasible to construct an inventory using the lowest tier in the IPCC hierarchy.30 The 
background paper on GHG inventory provides details of data sources, methods and 
outputs. It may suffice here to state that this study relied on international databases 
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) (for energy) and the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (for livestock numbers) and national 
sources (for the remaining sectors and industries). The methodology developed in the 
inventory remains an important step forward in constructing a rigorous and replicable 
framework that can be built on.
The construction of the inventory is detailed in a separate (background) report prepared 
for this project.31 For the purposes of the current summary report we focus on: (a) our 
inventory findings only and its contribution and (b) brief recommendations for the future 
process of ‘official’ estimation of an inventory for Kuwait.
The background paper on our GHG inventory discusses details of the evolution of emis-
sion inventory reports produced by the Kuwait Environmental Public Authority (KEPA). 
Three key stages, and associated documents, are worth noting. The first was published 
in May 2018, although this was relatively outdated; that is, it was produced in 2012 with a 
considerable lag in the base year for the inventory (1994).32 A second publication followed 
in April 2019, this time with a baseline inventory year of 2000: a longer lag than the initial 
28   ‘Inventory Software User Manual Version 2.691’, IPCC (2020). Available at https://www.ipcc-nggip.
iges.or.jp/software/files/IPCCInventorySoftwareUserManualV2_691.pdf  (accessed 29 April 2021). 
29   Taka Hiraishi and Buruhani Nyenzi, ‘Chapter 7:  Methodological Choice and Recalculation’ in IPCC 
Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Kanagawa, 
Japan: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2000).
30   What this means is that we use one-year baseline data, which focuses on ensuring consistencies 
between a range of relationships between variables included in the inventory process as well as other 
indicators in the economy. Most obviously in terms of limitations is that it is not possible to examine 
trends in GHGs nor is more complex specification of parameters possible.  
31   See footnote 1 of this report. Background paper (b) cited there sets out the steps and data required 
for GHG inventory construction and so can be regarded as a draft/preliminary manual for future use 
and refinement.
32   ‘Kuwait’s Initial National Communications under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’, Kuwait Environment Public Authority (November 2012). Available at https://epa.org.kw/
Portals/0/PDF/Initial%20national%20communication%20for%20state%20of%20kuwait.pdf (accessed 
29 April 2021).
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report. Our own study report was compiled using the KEPA 2000 inventory33 as a refer-
ence point, bringing forward KEPA’s estimates to 2015 and comparing with our results. 
However, a third KEPA publication was produced in September 2019.34 What is notable 
is that the baseline for this third report was 2016, a relatively short lag compared to the 
previous two summaries of KEPA inventories. 
These improvements are to be welcomed and indicate enhanced commitments by the 
Kuwaiti authorities to strengthen the evidence base for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation policies. Our own study results have been compared and contrasted with 
the latest KEPA emission report (as shown below in Table 4). Unfortunately, we can 
compare only results but not methods. KEPA assert that they have utilised the IPCC 
protocol in compiling their inventory. Yet it is unclear whether this refers to IPCC 
primary data collection instruments or a full utilisation of IPCC software to generate 
the KEPA quantitative results. 
By contrast, our study – and resulting inventory – offers explanations of sources of 
data inputs (mostly secondary sources), data entry procedures and computations in 
the IPCC software and reporting results in standard IPCC procedure. To that extent, our 
study lays down foundations in applying the IPCC protocol in constructing our GHG 
emissions inventory for Kuwait. An advantage in our application is that this allows con-
sistent data entry and reporting styles and, in turn, means our inventory is replicable 
and can be improved on in a transparent way. 
Turning now to our results, Table 2 summarises our inventory in terms of the three most 
significant GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and, nitrous oxide (N2O). The 
data in the first row is presented, for purposes of comparison, in CO2 equivalent units 
(i.e. based on the global warming potential of each gas relative to CO2). This data refers to 
gigagrams (Gg) or ‘000 tonnes of these gases in total for the entire economy. The rest of 
the table disaggregates this total for four domestic sectors plus Kuwait’s share of interna-
tional emissions. This data refers to the percentage of the total Gg of CO2, CH4 and N2O. 
For example, the energy sector accounts for 93.1 percent of CO2 emissions. The waste 
sector accounts for just over 17 percent of CH4 and N2O in total.
33   ‘State of Kuwait Second National Communication’, Kuwait Environment Public Authority (originally 
posted with April and later updated to July 2019 as its publication date). Available at https://unfccc.
int/sites/default/files/resource/94235106_Kuwait-NC2-2-KUWAIT%20SNC%20%20final%20v2.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2021).
34   ‘First Bi-Annual Update Report of the State of Kuwait’, Kuwait Environment Public Authority 
(September 2019). Available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/NationalReports/
Documents/391865_Kuwait-BUR1-1-State%20of%20Kuwait%20-%20BUR.pdf (accessed 29 April 2021).
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Table 2: Summary of a Greenhouse Gas Inventory for Kuwait (Gg or ‘000 tonnes CO2 
equivalent) – 2015 Baseline
Categories CO2 CH4 N2O Total GHGs
National: Total Emissions 
and Removals 
108,012 25,033 529 133,575
1 - Energy 93.1% 75.6% 73.6% 93.1%
   1.A - Fuel Combustion 
Activities 
88.4% 0.7% 58.4% 88.4%
   1.B - Fugitive Emissions 
from Fuels 
4.7% 74.9% 15.2% 4.7%
2 - Industrial Processes 
and Product Use 
6.9% 6.5% 0.0% 6.9%
   2.A - Mineral Industry 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6%
   2.B - Chemical Industry 3.7% 6.5% 0.0% 3.7%
   2.C - Metal Industry 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
   2.D - Non-Energy 
Products from Fuels and 
Solvent Use 
1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6%
3 - Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Other Land Use 
0.0% 0.6% 9.0% 0.0%
   3.A - Livestock 0.0% 0.6% 9.0% 0.0%
4 - Waste 0.0% 17.3% 17.4% 0.0%
   4.A - Solid Waste 
Disposal 
0.0% 14.6% 0.0% 0.0%
   4.D - Wastewater 
Treatment and Discharge 
0.0% 2.6% 17.4% 0.0%
International bunkers: 
Aviation
5.5% 0.0% 9.6% 5.5%
It is worth benchmarking our findings against existing data sources on Kuwait’s GHG 
emissions. The most prominent of these is arguably the data published by KEPA.35 Table 
3 provides a comparison of this data and our inventory. 
For energy emissions, the CO2 emissions estimated by KEPA are about four fifths of 
total CO2 in our inventory. For CH4, accounting for fugitive emissions is of critical 
significance and offers the main basis for comparison between our inventory and 
these existing sources. 
35   Other existing sources are: the International Energy Agency, World Bank and the Kuwait Carbon 
Atlas. Many of the comments we make in the context of KEPA also apply to these sources.
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For Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU), while KEPA does include these emis-
sions the estimate in our inventory appears to be more comprehensive. As Table 2 
previously indicated, these emissions amount to around 7 percent of both CO2 and total 
GHG emissions. Nor does KEPA estimate emissions from CH4 in the IPPU sector. As illus-
trated in Table 3 (and in Table 2), such emissions are substantial.
In the waste sector, perhaps due to our emphasis on fuller measurement of CH4 emissions, 
this yields an estimate which is more than twice as large as that in KEPA (as discussed 
in detail in the background paper). Our estimates for the agriculture and land-use (LU) 
sector are the closest to those provided by the KEPA source.
The uses that this inventory might potentially address are also significant. For wealth 
accounting, this provides the basis for a more accurate picture of global damage caused 
by Kuwait’s GHG emissions. For example, assuming a relatively conservative value of 
the social costs of carbon of USD 30 tonnes of CO2,36 gives an estimate of this damage 
equivalent to around 3.5 percent of Kuwaiti GDP in 2015. In terms of policy analysis, a 
GHG inventory can provide the baseline for modelling the impacts of energy policies, for 
example, on the path of GHG emissions and/or on the broader economy.
Table 3: Comparison of GHG Inventory for this Study with KEPA
CO2 CH4 N2O Totals
KEPA
Total National Emissions 
and Removals 
83,911 2,383 407 86,701
        Energy 81,985 273 329 82,587
        IPPU 1,932 0 0 1,932
        Agriculture  & LU -10 164 13 167
        Waste 4 1,946 65 2,015
LSE-KISR (Current study)
Total National Emissions 
and Removals 
108,012 25,033 529 133,575
        Energy 100,540 18,930 390 119,860
        IPPU 7,472 1,637 0 9,109
        Agriculture & LU 0 148 47 195
        Waste 0 4,319 92 4,411
36   This is the unit value used in World Bank (2019), for example. While there is considerable debate 
about exactly what this social cost is, reviews typically place this in a range of about USD 10 to 100 per 
tonne of CO2.
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Improving any official inventory of Kuwait’s GHG emissions is a matter of importance 
at two levels. First, this means improvements in the evidence base for decision-making 
regarding environmental policy at the country level. Second, improvements in the quality 
of emission inventory means accurate data would be submitted to IPCC, a contribution 
to strengthening the evidence base for climate change and global warming policies on a 
global scale. While our study illustrates the likely outcome in terms of GHG estimates and 
the mechanical steps to reach that point, this will also entail attention to issues of process. 
Specifically, it will entail the work of, and coordination between, a number of government 
actors each responsible for a specific aspect of the GHG exercises. 
This points to several considerations regarding capacity building in organisations such 
as KEPA. The CSB of the State of Kuwait is also well placed to assist with addressing 
remaining gaps in any GHG emissions inventory but this will entail necessarily boost-
ing its environmental data programme. Other actors are critical to particular economic 
sectors. Notably, this includes the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) in the case of 
energy, the Public Authority of Agriculture Affairs and Fish Resources (PAAFR) in the 
case of agriculture and the Public Authority for Industry (PAI). Moreover, opportunities 
for cost-effective GHG mitigation may well exist in the waste management sector. If so, 
then the Kuwait Municipality (KM) is well placed to assist in understanding how to make 
a GHG inventory more responsive to such opportunities. 
Above all, however, there is a critical need for all these organisations to coordinate and work 
together. In this regard, the coordination framework established in the latest KEPA emissions 
report is a step in the right direction. The capacity built with regard to data collection, organ-
isation and storage procedures outlined in the KEPA report may need to be accompanied by 
a strong technical team of experts to undertake the actual estimation of the GHG emissions. 
Such a technical team led by KEPA will strengthen Kuwait’s capacity to construct a robust 
and replicable GHG emissions inventory while taking account of crosscutting sectoral chal-
lenges that inevitably arise. This would also leverage the assistance of further organisations. 
For example, in the course of this study, the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) 
has evolved substantial expertise in constructing GHG inventories.
4. Economic Impacts of Climate Change: The Example of 
Food Security
Climate change will undoubtedly present numerous risks to development prospects in 
Kuwait. Understanding these risks is crucial. In this section, we explore the implications 
of one example: food security. Kuwait’s geographic location in an arid zone necessi-
tates it being heavily dependent on food imports (81 percent).37 This is a question of 
degree. While Kuwait is not an agricultural economy, there is still significant activity in 
domestic sectors in vegetables (45 percent), dairy and poultry products (39 percent).38 
Nonetheless, it remains true that imports constitute the bulk of the country’s food 
37   ‘Food Balance’, FAO (2017). Available at http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FBS (accessed 29 April 2021).
38   Ibid.
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supply. As a result, Kuwait’s food security status is greatly influenced by what happens 
in world markets. A changing climate can be viewed, in turn, as an exogenous shock to 
this status, unfolding over the long term.39
Our analysis of Kuwait’s food security combines IPCC climate/economy sce-
narios with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Kuwait. These 
global scenarios are long-term projections intended to represent pathways for 
socioeconomic development outcomes and climate mitigation/adaptation actions 
(technically speaking from a baseline as 1990 through to 2100).40 These projec-
tions are described below. Each has been given a technical label by the IPCC (i.e. 
a numbered SSP or shared socioeconomic pathway) but corresponds to storylines 
involving possible future worlds with plausible permutations of socioeconomic 
outcomes, climate policy and climate-related outcomes.
SSP1: a green economy pathway, characterised by relatively straightforward implementation 
of mitigation and adaptation options.
SSP2: an intermediate pathway, where there are moderate challenges to global mitigation 
and adaptation.
SSP3: a pathway where there are substantial challenges to mitigation and adaptation.
SSP4: entails low challenges to implementing mitigation but high challenges for adaptation.
SSP5: a pathway where economic growth is assigned primacy with corresponding low pri-
ority assigned to climate mitigation, but adaptation is adopted.
In what follows, we present results for each of these scenarios. Clearly, however, some of 
these appear more distinguishable than others. In this respect, we view SSP5 as a baseline, 
which can be taken as the highest end scenario in terms of its implications for Kuwait.41 SSP1 
is the clearest contrast to this pathway, where a global green economy entails far fewer polit-
ical and economic obstacles. Detailed descriptions of the scenarios are provided in Table 
A1.1 in Annex 1. The importance of these scenarios for current purposes is that they have 
been used to generate food production and agricultural land-use for each of these scenarios. 
The projection scenarios were obtained from the SSP database.42,43
39   The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a glimpse of these issues in the Kuwaiti context.
40   The projections are produced by modelling at a global scale and then focusing on broad regional 
groups (OECD, ASIA, ALM); ALM denoting Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Put this way, 
these scenarios represent a high level of aggregation and as such represent a first look at the way in 
which classes of climate risk affect an individual economy such as Kuwait.  
41   See: ‘Explainer: The High-Emissions “RCP8.5” Global Warming Scenario’, Carbon Brief, 21 August 
2019. Available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-the-high-emissions-rcp8-5-global-warming-
scenario (accessed 29 April 2021).
42   See Shared Socioeconomic Pathways website: https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb (accessed 23 June 2020). 
See: Keywan Riahi et al., ‘The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their Energy, Land Use, and Green-
house Gas Emissions Implications: An Overview’, Global Environmental Change 42 (2017), pp. 153–68.
43   These particular scenarios apply to 2005 to 2100. Given the base year of the Kuwaiti economic model 
we use is 2013, it has been necessary to change the base year to 2010 given this is closer to 2013. In 
order to show the position of the Middle East and Africa region relative the world average, the projected 
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We investigate impacts of Kuwait food security by using a CGE model for Kuwait. 
The model was calibrated on the Kuwaiti social accounting matrix (SAM)44 which was 
constructed with 2013 as its base year.45 This model was additionally adapted for the 
purposes of this project in other important respects. The objective of these adaptations 
was: (a) to better align the CGE model with the long-term nature of the IPCC scenarios;46 
and (b) the specification of the production process to better reflect the supply chain 
describing the use of energy commodities in the economy.47 
The connection of this model to our foregoing discussion of IPCC/SSP scenarios is how 
these effects play out via food prices in the world market. That is, climate change shapes 
demand and supply relationships for food products by influencing agricultural produc-
tivity across the global economy. Changes in food prices in the world market occur 
because of excess demand for food, where the latter is defined in terms of the balance of 
changes between demand and production. Specifically, we make use of this relationship 
to construct a world food price index (WPI) from estimated excess demand for crops. 
This WPI then can be used as an exogenous variable to shock the Kuwaiti national 
model through the influence on the world food price path on food imports. Since the 
WPIs are separately constructed for each of the five SSP scenarios, the impacts of each 
scenario on Kuwait’s food security status were separately quantified.  
figures were converted to indices as changes from the 2010 baseline year scenario.
44   A SAM is a matrix format based on the sequence of accounts in the System of National Accounts. 
The CGE model we use consolidates the Kuwaiti SAM into a matrix of 146 by 146 individual accounts, 
describing generation of output and income in the economy as well as its (re)distribution and final use.
45   Ayele Gelan et al., ‘Designing and Constructing a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the State of 
Kuwait, Final Project Report’ (Project No. P114-17IA-01). Submitted to the Kuwait Foundation for the 
Advancement of Sciences (October 2018).
46   Our model uses a recursive dynamic formulation. This involves period-by-period updating of stock 
variables (population, labour force and capital stock), replicating the SAM for each period.  
47   For details of the CGE model equations see: Ayele Gelan, ‘Economic and Environmental Impacts of 
Electricity Subsidy Reform in Kuwait: A General Equilibrium Analysis’, Energy Policy 112/2 (2018), pp. 
381–98; Ayele Gelan et al., ‘Designing and Constructing a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the State 
of Kuwait, Final Project Report’.
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Figure 2 begins by summarising the implied import price path – based, in turn, on the WPI 
– and changes for each SSP scenario. These are increases in import prices from baseline 
levels (=1.0). All SSP scenarios show sharp increases in the prices of imported food prod-
ucts in the Kuwaiti domestic market beyond 2030. SSP5 projects a nearly 4.5-fold increase 
from the 2010 level while SSP1 is the least steep entailing a nearly 2.5-fold increase in 
imported food prices. The other scenarios fall in between these two extremes. 
Before proceeding to our discussion of the results arising from these price paths on the 
Kuwaiti economy, we emphasise two modelling considerations which contextualise these 
findings. First, it is important not to rule out, by assumption, substitution of domestic 
production for food imports. We assume, however, that there is limited scope for this 
and our model limits substantial switching to domestic output as a result of escalating 
import prices.48 Secondly, the purpose of this study is to isolate and examine climate sce-
nario effects on food security. All else, in effect, remains equal. As a practical matter this 
means that existing government policy such as subsidies is assumed to be left in place. But 
clearly changing these policies may also create additional impacts on our results. More-
over, a changing climate may make agricultural production more challenging in Kuwait to 
an extent not reflected in relatively broad brush IPCC scenarios that we use.
48   Specifically, we assume that the substitution parameter between imports and domestically produced 
food is inelastic. We vary this assumption in our sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 3 disaggregates the impacts of import price changes on two components of domes-
tic food production: primary and processed food. This distinction is important because 
as the figure shows, the fortunes for these products are divergent under the scenarios. In 
terms of the overall picture, however, what happens in the processed food sector is critical 
as its weight in the composition of domestic food production is relatively large.  
But Figure 3 further emphasises that higher import prices have contractionary effects on 
food processing. The reason is that this increases costs of production due to higher prices 
for intermediate inputs which are imported (e.g. cereals for flour mills, powdered milk 
for dairy processing plants and so on). By contrast, rising world market prices for primary 
farm products mean that domestic production of primary products becomes more 
feasible, within the limits of what is technically possible (i.e. substitution) as we have pre-
viously discussed. It should be recalled, however, that we assume here that comparatively 
generous government subsidies stay in place. If this system is judged to be unsustainable 
(perhaps due to falling oil revenues and fiscal probity) then this will circumscribe further 
the scope for expanding domestic food production. Energy policy and concerns about 
water scarcity are important considerations too.49 
Next we turn to impacts on food imports. This is especially critical given that ultimately 
Kuwait is bound to rely on imports to feed a growing population. Figure 4 presents 
percentage changes in level of food imports from between the initial and final periods, 
2010 and 2100. An increase in primary food imports is projected to rise from 127 percent 
(SSP5) to 155 percent (SSP1). The corresponding percentage increases for processed 
food would be 155 percent and 207 percent respectively. These results are likely to rep-
resent conservative estimates of Kuwait’s future food imports. The results reported in 
49   Siderius, Conway, Yassine, Murken and Lostis, ‘Characterising the Water-Energy-Food Nexus in 
Kuwait and the Gulf Region’. 
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this study hinged on projected world market prices. It is likely that prices of food would 
increase by larger proportions, causing food import increases to be much higher than 
the results we report in this study.








































CGE models are calibrated to baseline data as well as the underlying SAM and a variety 
of assumed values for parameters in production and demand functions. It is import-
ant, therefore, to explore the sensitivity of results to changes in these assumptions. 
We conducted sensitivity analysis, particularly of one key parameter: the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and imported food products. Our main assumption is 
that import demand for food is not overly sensitive to changes in prices of goods in 
the world market.50 This reflects the reality of Kuwait’s arid environment which limits 
its capacity to switch to local production and so move away from reliance on imports. 
We conducted sensitivity analysis by varying this assumption within the inelastic range 
it might take, that is, we further assume that substitution is lower and higher than 
we model previously.51 As would be expected, the higher the possibility to substitute 
domestic product for imports, the greater the stimulating effects of price increases in 
socioeconomic pathways on the domestic economy.  
It is worth briefly considering the policy implications of this sensitivity analysis. It is 
important to note that the exogenous shock applied to the model was an increase in 
the price of food in the world market. The impact of this shock on import-domestic 
food supply composition would depend on the value elasticity of import demand. This 
essentially encapsulates the possibility of switching to local food products in response to 
price rises in foreign products. The results suggest the importance of shifting consumer 
50   Specifically, we assume an elasticity of substitution of 0.5. This is in the middle of the range of 
inelastic values for this parameter (i.e. between 0 and less than 1). 
51   That is, elasticities take a value of 0.2 and 0.8 respectively.
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preferences to local products. In practice, the actual shift to local food is constrained 
by two factors: (a) capacity to produce locally and supply to the domestic market and 
(b) consumer taste or preference for local goods. As far as domestic production is con-
cerned, the most important thing to do is to shift from the current material intensive 
agricultural production systems to a sustainable mode of food production within the 
limits set by the natural environment.52 
In summary, all this makes clear that our simulation experiments serve only to frame 
thoughts on food security.53 Actual outcomes are contingent on a number of factors, 
although a number of the most important are arguably within the reach of policy-making. 
Much else is framed by the SSP scenarios themselves. For example, SSP5 is the most chal-
lenging of these scenarios whereas SSP1 is associated with a more favourable transition for 
food security concerns. The latter offers a relatively cheaper food import scenario. This 
means less costly intermediate inputs, or cheaper primary food products which will be 
processed domestically. Cheaper primary agricultural products, however, also mean less 
favourable conditions for local primary producers. Given that we have judged SSP5 to be 
‘business as usual’, in effect, Kuwait would expect to pay less for food imports with alter-
native SSP scenarios than if current trends (i.e. SSP5) continue to prevail in the long term.
5. Overall Conclusions
Our focus on the challenge of sustainability in Kuwait, especially in the context of climate 
change, has led us to examine three, related but distinct, elements of this wide-ranging 
debate:
• Wealth accounting: the importance of extending existing metrics of national wealth 
and non-renewable natural capital in assessing development prospects in Kuwait; 
• Greenhouse (GHG) emissions inventory: the centrality of constructing robust, yet rep-
licable, building blocks for understanding Kuwait’s contribution to climate change; 
• Climate risk assessment: the criticality of assessing development risks arising from 
climate change on the Kuwaiti economy, starting with the example of food security.
In what follows, we provide some brief conclusions for each of these strands of our work, 
and finally we draw together collective implications and possible future directions.
With regards to wealth accounting, estimating depletion values and natural resource 
income arising from the production of non-renewable natural capital provides import-
ant development insights. For example, depletion values are an important sustainability 
52   Notably, Kuwait has proven capacity for self-sufficiency in vegetables. See also: Afaf Al-Nasser and M. 
Razzaque, ‘Kuwait Food Security within the Context of Climate Change: Animal Production Systems’, 
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (Kuwait City, 2014).
53   We have also explored, as is standard in CGE models, the GDP effect on our food price shocks. These 
are reported in our background report but we do not summarise here. These were negligible, even after 
accounting for intersectoral feedback effects.
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benchmark against which official savings commitments can be evaluated (such as the 
amount set aside each year to be invested in a sovereign wealth fund). This underlines the 
importance of official statistical systems (i.e. those of the Kuwaiti CSB) in implementing 
the Central Framework of the UN’s System of Environmental-Economic Accounting.
With regards to a GHG emissions inventory, we have shown that existing data sources 
describing Kuwait’s emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are likely to 
be underestimated (perhaps by at least one quarter to one third). In doing so, we show 
the empirical importance of including previously ignored emissions sources from sectors 
otherwise well assessed (e.g. fugitive emissions in the energy sector) and a more compre-
hensive coverage of emissions from less well studied sources such as in the waste sector. 
This inventory construction, moreover, strictly follows the IPCC guidelines. It is therefore 
easily replicable and a more robust and comprehensive inventory in official policy pro-
cesses is clearly of some importance. 
With regards to our climate risk assessment, understanding risks as a result of climate 
change is crucial to prudent assessment of development prospects. Food security, as 
we show, provides a useful starting point for this in the context of Kuwait (given its 
dependence on imported food products). By linking IPCC climate change scenarios to 
an economic model for Kuwait, we show the impacts of changing world food prices on 
the cost of imports and scope for substituting for domestic activities in both the food 
production and processing sectors. 
What does all this imply for judgements about the sustainability of Kuwait’s current 
development trajectory? Clearly our picture here is incomplete. But our results on the 
proportion of resource depletion values that are invested in the Future Generations Fund 
raises questions about sustaining wealth in this context. Whilst a robust emissions inven-
tory is an essential input to economic models that seek to understand the implications 
of policies such as Kuwait’s energy strategy, in terms of contribution to the global climate 
liability these domestic (production) emissions are a small share. Nonetheless, assessing 
climate risks to the domestic economy is the other side of this coin. While food security 
is only one critical risk in this regard, our partial assessment suggests that challenges for 
climate adaptation in Kuwait also need to be urgently considered. 
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